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ABSTRACT
Many studies have found a negative relationship between oil abundance and democracy. However, recent studies have tried to upend this correlation 
by employing time-series techniques or finding a conditionality on other factors. This study contributes to the literature by employing an Arellano 
Bond model that corrects for fixed effects and adopts new variables from recent empirical studies. Comparing Eurasia and Latin America from the 
1960s to 2010, we find that the theory of a negative relationship between an abundance of natural resources and democracy remains valid. 
Keywords: Natural Resource Curse, Natural Resource Dependence, Democracy, Natural Resource Abundance 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Studies on the natural resource curse attempt to identify whether 
an abundance of natural resources is an asset or hindrance to 
potential economic growth (Asif et al., 2020; Fosu and Gafa, 2019; 
Badeeb et al., 2017). To contribute to the literature, we propose 
a new econometric technique to consider this phenomenon in-
depth. At one point in history, it was nearly universally accepted 
that dependence on natural resources could lead to adverse 
consequences. This agreement stems from the work of Sachs 
and Warner (1995), which indicated that dependence on natural 
resources hampers economics growth. Similarly, Ross (2001) and 
Mahdavy (1970) indicated that dependence on natural resources 
could lead to a lower level of democracy.
Several recent studies have challenged the term natural resource 
curse” and the negative association that comes with it. Haber 
and Menaldo (2011) claimed that reliance on natural resources 
does not affect the level of democracy; they argued that most 
studies have econometric issues. In response, we propose a new 
econometric technique modeled on the Arellano-Bond estimator. 
Our research focused on the regions of Eurasia and Latin America 
and concentrated on the association between natural resource rents 
and democracy. The results indicate that the negative association 
between the two variables is still valid. This result is valuable 
for policymakers; it could nudge them to avoid dependence on 
natural resources.
Beginning with Ross (2001), scholars have employed cross-
country regression frameworks to examine the hypothesis that 
mineral-based wealth perpetuates authoritarianism (Aslaksen, 
2010; Goldberg et al., 2008; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; 
Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008; Ross, 2009; 2012; Smith, 
2007; Wantchekon, 2002). Most have found that higher oil 
revenues lead to a lower probability of a country adopting a 
democratic institution. Boix (2003) argued that no country had 
ever transitioned successfully to democracy if oil generated more 
than one-third of its export earnings. 
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Only a few empirical studies have (a) found the opposite to be the 
case, (b) differentiated between degrees of the curse, or (c) found 
that the natural resource curse was conditional based on other 
factors. Herb (2005) reasoned that resource-reliant countries would 
have been substantially poorer if they had not found oil, and their 
lower GDPs would have caused them to be even less democratic. 
Dunning (2008) found that the effect of natural resources on regime 
type was conditional based on other factors. According to Ross 
(2009), neither Russia nor Venezuela seemed to display a direct 
correlation between resource rents and authoritarianism; instead, 
they fell into a middle category separate from the states in the 
Persian Gulf. Treisman (2010) calculated that, for countries like 
Russia with an established oil industry, even significant increases 
in the scale of mineral incomes had only a minor effect on the 
political regime. Luong and Weinthal (2010) pointed to the state 
ownership of the minerals (not the resource wealth) for limiting 
democracy. Haber and Menaldo (2011) critiqued the cross-
country empirical studies for their lack of time-series methods 
and comparing resource-reliant countries with resource-poor 
countries. They concluded there was no discernible influence of 
oil on democracy. This study considers the criticism of Haber 
and Menaldo (2011) and proposes a new econometric technique 
to test whether natural resource dependence affects the level of 
democracy. 
The study ascertains whether the recent empirical studies have 
reappraised the consensus held by scholars that increased oil 
revenue leads to less-democratic institutions. Our primary research 
question regards the effect of resource rents on democracy and the 
conditions under which this effect tends to increase in importance. 
To estimate the effects of the factors and interactions proposed in 
the literature, we employed a regression technique in which the 
dependent variable was democracy, and the explanatory variables 
included economic, political, ethnic, and religious factors. We 
adapted and modified Dunning’s (2008) quantifiable model and 
employed it on five Latin American states and fifteen Eurasian 
states from 1960 to 2010. To control for country-specific factors, 
we employed an Arellano-Bond model that corrected for fixed 
effects critiqued by Haber and Menaldo (2011) in their use of 
time-series techniques. We added Loung and Weinthal’s (2010) 
variable of state ownership as an intervening variable between 
wealth and the institutional outcome. This study further validated 
the theory that natural resource abundance hinders the level of 
democracy. There is a strong correlation between rising resource 
rents—that is, the percentage of oil revenue to GDP—and a decline 
in democracy. Meanwhile, countries with higher GDP (regardless 
of oil revenues) tended to have stronger democracies than the 
other countries, which is another valuable insight for policymakers 
around the world.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1. Literature Review
Ross (2001) published a pivotal empirical study assessing the 
association between natural resource dependence and the level 
of democracy in a country. His primary explanatory variable of 
oil dependence was derived from the ratio between the value of a 
country’s oil exports and its GDP. He used the Polity IV index as 
a dependent variable to measure the level of democracy among 
countries. The study covered the 1971-1997 period. The data 
indicated that a country’s oil dependence negatively correlates 
with its level of democracy. He concluded that a wealth of oil 
was a good indicator of a potentially authoritarian government. 
The study attracted several scholars, which helped in producing 
several studies that confirmed the negative correlation between 
natural resource dependence and the level of democracy (Adams 
et al., 2019; Dunn, 2017, Aslaksen, 2010; Goldberg et al., 2008; 
Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008; 
Ross, 2009; 2012; Smith, 2007; Wantchekon, 2002; Sandbakken, 
2006; van der Ploeg, 2011). 
Herb (2005) is one of the early scholars who disagreed with 
Ross (2001). Herb also assessed the effect of natural resource 
dependence on the level of democracy. His sample was based 
on several countries in the Middle East and Africa. He used 
Freedom House’s democracy score as a measurement on which his 
dependent variable was based. Freedom House is an independent 
index that assesses the level of democracy of most countries 
around the world. He measured a country’s reliance on natural 
resources based on the ratio of its natural resource revenues to 
its total revenues. He also used Ross’ (2001) dependent variable 
of net oil exports as a percentage of GDP while controlling for 
several economic, political, and religious variables. The results 
showed that natural resources have negative effects on the level 
of democracy. However, Herb clarified that his results do not 
necessarily support the natural resources curse theory. Herb 
(2005) stated that most of the resource-rich countries are located 
in politically and economically deficient regions. He elucidated 
that countries with higher dependency on oil and natural resources 
would still be less democratic if they had not known their lands 
contained those resources. Herb’s (2005) fundamental observation 
is that the research methods and techniques studies employed 
are insufficient for making definitive conclusions that natural 
resources hinder a society’s level of democracy.
Several recent studies have noted that techniques employed in the 
natural resource curse literature may yield biased results. Dunning 
(2008) attempted to address the possibility of conditional effects. 
He argued that, historically, Venezuela had a stronger democracy 
because of oil, particularly when oil prices were high, as rents 
mitigated the redistributive tensions in a highly unequal society. 
Dunning proposed two hypotheses: (a) there is a conditionally 
positive effect of natural resources on democracy when the degree 
of resource dependence is lower; and (b) there is a conditionally 
positive effect of natural resources on democracy when the degree 
of inequality in non-resource sectors of the economy is higher. 
It is the mitigation of inequality, rather than the desire to control 
the distribution of resource rents, that becomes the focus of the 
elite. This situation then lessens the elites’ incentives to take 
power by force. 
Dunning (2008) introduced an interaction of private inequality 
with resource wealth into his model, with resource wealth as 
the independent variable. His results show that resource wealth 
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negatively correlates with the level of democracy. The coefficient 
of the interaction term (resource rents and private inequality) was 
positive. This result indicates that the effect of resource wealth could 
be positive for some countries and negative for others. Dunning’s 
finding challenges the theory that natural resources are a curse.
Haber and Menaldo (2011, p. 4) have, however, indicated that, by 
adding the capital share of non-oil value, these regressions employ 
a measure of inequality that omits the oil sector. This situation leads 
to a potential overestimation of the share of income earned by labor 
in oil-rich countries with undiversified economies, such those as in 
the Middle East. That is, the regressions in the literature may not 
account for a fixed effect associated with undiversified oil economies. 
Treisman (2010) argued that fears of rising authoritarianism 
associated with rising energy prices had been exaggerated. He 
calculated that even large increases in the scale of mineral incomes 
had only minor effects on the political regime of countries with an 
established oil industry. He employed Polity IV scores (Marshall 
and Jaggers, 2010) and regression with fixed and random effects, 
thereby controlling for country, year, GDP (logged), and oil and 
gas income per capita (logged). Apart from the polity scores, the 
data in Treisman (2010) are from the Penn World Tables. 
Treisman claimed his findings indicated that the volatility of 
Russia’s petroleum income could explain no more than a small 
fraction of the changes in its political regime between the 1985 
and 2010 period. However, a polity is not capable of generating 
a high, explainable variance (r-squared). Moreover, the data 
from the Penn World Tables are at 5-year intervals. Thus, while 
Treisman’s sample size is larger than other studies, his model does 
not facilitate controlling for measured, explanatory factors capable 
of estimating the mediating effect of interaction between oil rents 
and other variables, such as state ownership. 
Loung and Weinthal (2010) criticized the resource curse literature 
for failing to specify the causal mechanisms that link resource 
wealth to negative economic and political outcomes. They argue 
that ownership and control of the mineral sector is the crucial 
intervening variable between wealth and the institutional outcome. 
Their work focused on five petroleum-rich states that were former 
members of the Soviet Union—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Their data (from 1990 to 2005) 
indicated that ownership structure is not endogenous to fiscal 
regimes and is not a universal principle; however, it is a variable 
in the analysis of developmental prospects for mineral-rich states. 
Their work highlights the importance of including a variable 
controlling for the ownership of the country’s mineral industry.
Dunning (2008) and Treisman (2010) employed regressions, of 
which Haber and Menaldo (2011) criticized because countries 
differ from each other based on fixed, unobserved characteristics. 
Haber and Menaldo (2011) studied records from 168 countries for 
the 1800 to 2006 period, constructing four unique measures of 
natural resource reliance and two popular measures of regime type. 
They wanted to detect and estimate time-series relationships to 
determine whether a wealth of natural resources always gives rise 
to autocracy or whether this only occurs under certain conditions. 
They categorized countries according to income level, inequality, 
the threshold level of resource reliance, period, and region and 
estimated separate regressions on these subsamples. Hypothesizing 
a counterfactual path that a resource-reliant country’s regime 
type would have followed in the absence of those resources, 
they compared this path to the actual path to see whether any 
divergence of the paths correlated with increased resource reliance. 
The only statistically significant relationship they found was that 
increased natural resource incomes are positively correlated with 
an increased level of democracy. 
By using the polity score that correlates over time in a dynamic 
relationship, Haber and Menaldo (2011) argued that the fixed 
characteristics could a) lead to higher or lower polity scores, 
b) include oil and natural resources, and c) create apparent 
correlations which are devoid of causal interpretation. The dynamic 
relationship results in 1 year’s polity score will imperfectly predict 
the next year’s, as factors change over time. 
Haber and Menaldo (2011) primarily used an error correction 
model. As the name implies, this model is used to describe a time 
series in which the equilibrium, or investment level, is sought over 
several periods and found by correcting errors. Their equilibrium 
polity is attained over several periods and is possibly affected by 
fiscal reliance (percentage of government revenues from oil, gas, or 
minerals) on oil income, civil war, regional democratic diffusion, 
world democratic diffusion, or country fixed effects. Explanatory 
variables are entered as levels, changes, and lagged changes. 
However, grouping countries in this manner misses the effects 
of own-country lags and fixed effects. The apparent resource 
curse is, thus, a downward adjustment of polity scores over time 
toward equilibrium—the lagged polity score term—which has a 
statistically significant and negative effect in every model. Thus, 
resources are reducing that downward trend.
2.2. Hypothesis Development
Given the literature, there are two streams of findings: one finds 
that natural resources can affect the level of democracy negatively, 
and the other finds that there is no association between natural 
resource dependence and the level of democracy. This study 
bridges between the two streams by using a new econometric 
technique that accounts for much of the criticism that different 
authors have raised. With this new econometric technique, we 
aimed to determine whether natural resource dependence affects a 
country’s level of democracy? Based on the results of most papers 
in the literature, we hypothesized that natural resource dependence 
would indeed affect the democracy level, and the effects would 
negatively correlate with the level of natural resource dependence. 
More succinctly, we hypothesized that the dependence on natural 
resources leads to a lower level of democracy (H1).
H1: Dependence on natural resources leads to a lower level of 
democracy.
3. MATERIALS AND METHODS
We follow the extant literature in four ways. We consider Dunning’s 
(2008) study on the resource curse in Latin America and compare 
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it to Eurasian countries. This consideration allows us to observe 
whether there is something particular to Latin America, specifically 
whether Venezuela is an outlier to the consensus that more oil 
means low-level democracy. We also expand the period from 1960 
to 2010, enabling us to estimate the longer-term effect of natural 
resources on a country’s regime type. We start with an enhanced 
version of Dunning’s model with econometrics, controlling for 
country fixed effects. Finally, we introduce a new variable of 
state ownership, previously applied only to Eurasian countries, 
which tests whether the timing and role of the government affect 
the tendency for natural resources to hamper democratic systems. 
Studies have used either graphical analysis or estimation, separately, 
for each of several countries, sets of countries, or periods to control 
for country fixed effects. Tests of co-integration between fiscal 
reliance and polity (i.e., whether there is a long-term, equilibrium 
relationship) have generally failed to find evidence for such a 
relationship. This situation implies, in macroeconomics, that a 
regression in levels might be subject to a correlation of trends, such 
as spurious correlation, thus signifying no real relationship at all. 
We added fixed effects to the Dunning (2008) model to control for 
fixed characteristics of countries and changes in the explanatory 
variables such as natural resource rents. Fixed effects cannot 
control for changing but unobserved characteristics of countries, 
and neither can any other technique. We minimize that problem 
by controlling for various factors that do change. We also estimate 
random effects, mostly as a robustness check, because we do not 
believe that fixed effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables, which is an assumption that random effects impose.
Fixed effects are differenced out of the model, changing all 
variables to differences over time. The differencing automatically 
controls for the lack of equilibrium in levels, which presents 
another challenge. It is important to note that the fixed effects 
might be inadequate (Haber and Menaldo, 2011), and the strongest 
correction would be to include a lagged dependent variable 
controlling for many unobserved aspects of the country. This 
situation immediately creates a larger problem: the fixed effect 
correlates with the lagged dependent variable and its differences. 
The solution to this basic problem in the estimation of time series 
over panels of countries, people, or businesses is the Arellano-
Bond estimation (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Arellano and Bond, 
1991; 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The estimation offers an 
alternative to standard fixed effects that could help improve the 
Dunning (2008) model and accounts for Haber and Menaldo’s 
(2011) critique of the standard fixed effects.
In the Arellano-Bond estimation, the lags and levels are not 
exogenous to the Polity determination. Thus, either the specification 
is faulty, or some explanatory variable is endogenous. We changed 
the state ownership to endogenous (i.e., jointly determined with 
polity), which solved the problem. While we did not anticipate 
this, it is the only change we made to the specification.
3.1. Measuring Regime Types 
The dependent variable in our study is the democracy score, 
measured from the Polity IV data set, which is referred to as polity 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). This standard measure of democracy 
employed in the resource curse literature is an index of a) the 
competitiveness of political participation, b) the openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, and c) the constraints 
on the chief executive; coded for all countries worldwide, from 
1800 to date. The scale runs from −10 to +10. Scores of −10 to −6 
represent autocracies, and scores of 6 to 10 represent democracies. 
We decided to use the polity index to measure democracy because 
it is the standard way employed by most studies.
3.2. Control Variables and Instrumental Variables
We replicated Dunning’s Latin model, compared with Eurasian 
countries, and employed a different econometric method. Our 
sample consisted of 15 Eurasian states (former Soviet republics), 
compared to 5 Latin American states. We have addressed Luong 
and Weinthal’s (2010) criticism of the resource curse literature 
as being too narrow in scope and duration (primarily covering 
1970 to 1990) by expanding our timeframe beyond Dunning’s 
work to cover the 1960-2010 period. We have also addressed the 
second criticism of Luong and Weinthal (2010) by including a 
variable controlling for oil ownership. Haber and Menaldo’s (2011) 
criticism of the use of standard fixed effects was also considered.
The Soviet Union collapsed into individual states in 1991; thus, 
the number of countries increased after this year. Before then, 
where available, the individual Soviet Socialist Republics were 
considered. We have corrected for this situation with fixed effects, 
which identify the individual countries. To estimate the mediating 
effect of interaction with oil rents and the effect of state ownership, 
we used a smaller set of countries than Treisman (2010) and 
incorporated a larger set of explanatory variables. Moreover, rather 
than the 5-year intervals in the Penn World Tables, the data are 
annual. Although our approach utilized a smaller sample size than 
Treisman (2010), this provided the ability to control for measured, 
explanatory factors. To compare Dunning’s (2008, p. 130) findings 
in Latin America with Eurasia, we replicated all of his variables, 
except capital share. Our estimation equation was as follows:
 Dit = α + β1 Rit + β2 θit + β3 (Rit * θit) + Xit ¥ + λi + εit (1)
Dit refers to a country’s democracy level in country i and year t. Rit 
is the resource rents per capita in a country. θ is the total natural 
resource rents over GDP. β3 represents the coefficient of the 
interaction term between the resource rents per capita and the total 
natural resource rents over GDP. X is a vector of control variables. 
λ represents the fixed effects, and ε is a random error.
We did not include Dunning’s capital variable, given that the 
data were only available for Latin America. We created our own 
variable, Oil Rents Per Capita, in $1 million units. We divided 
the oil rents as a percentage of GDP by population from 1970 
to 2010. We replaced Dunning’s Capital Share and Oil Rents 
* Capital Share (Interaction term) variable with Total Natural 
Resource Rents as a Percentage of GDP and Oil Rents * Total 
Natural Resource Rents as a Percentage of GDP (interaction term). 
Data came from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database online. The total natural resource rents represent GDP 
dependence on natural resource wealth within the country. 
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Dunning argued that the capital share variable provides a useful 
indicator of private inequality. Although a relatively poor majority 
obtains most of its income from labor in many countries, capital 
income tends to accrue to a relatively small elite (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2006a, p. 58-9, in Dunning, 2008, p. 117).
As noted above, Haber and Menaldo (2011, p. 4) have critiqued 
Dunning (2008) for employing the capital share of non-oil value-
added as a measure of inequality that omits the oil sector. Like 
Dunning (2008), we employed log GDP. However, unlike Dunning 
(2008), we employed a quadratic term for GDP. Lower levels 
of GDP do not show a significant effect. A larger GDP helped 
our analysis. Even though it is significant, it is still not linearly 
related. In all regressions, we controlled for the natural log of the 
countries’ GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity from the 
Penn World Tables) to control for the assumption that developed 
countries tend to be more democratic. All regressions were run 
on panels that included all countries for which data was available 
for the period from 1960 to 2010. 
Alesina et al. (2003) served as the data source for the Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization, Muslim Percentage 2001, Catholic Percentage 
2001, and Orthodox Percentage 2001 variables. We assumed 
2001 figures and equivalencies from 1960 through to 2010. We 
excluded the British Colony variable, as it does not pertain to 
Eurasia, nor was it a significant variable in Dunning’s (2008) 
modeling of Latin America. We also did not include the Sum 
of Transitions to Authoritarianism (adopted by Dunning from 
Cheibub and Gandhi, 2004; see Przeworski et al., 2000), which 
some researchers use because they believe democracy is best 
measured as a binary variable. Haber and Menaldo (2011) 
employed Regime (Przeworski et al., 2000), which extends from 
1800 to 2000. However, we adopted the aforementioned polity as 
our measure of democracy. 
We introduced the State Fragility Index variable available from 
the polity and Fragility Index (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010) to 
control for the effectiveness and the performance of each country. 
Following Luong and Weinthal’s (2010) research, we adopted 
their variable of ownership structure, extracting the Eurasian and 
Latin American countries under review from the cross-sectional 
dataset compiled on all relevant countries from 1900 to 2005. They 
disaggregated ownership and control into four possible resource 
development strategies: state ownership with control (S1), state 
ownership without control (S2), private domestic ownership (P1), 
and private foreign ownership (P2). Table 1 provides descriptive 
statistics of the variables of our study.
4. RESULTS
Polity, theoretically ranging from −10 to +10, comprised the 
dependent variable for this study. The countries in this study had 
a polity score of −9-10, with a mean of 2.3, a modal average of −9 
and +8, and a standard deviation of 6.6. Table 1 shows descriptive 
statistics for the regression distribution and all other variables, 
and Table 2 shows the coefficient estimates and tests of various 
hypotheses.
There is statistically significant evidence of country effects, and their 
correlation with the fitted values, −0.449, is a correlation whose 
standard error is the square root of 1/490 (or about 0.045). Random 
effects cannot account for the statistical correlation, as it is too far 
from zero. Nevertheless, the random-effects model is not much 
different from the fixed effects model in its parameters (available 
upon request) despite the misspecification that can happen.
Consistent with Dunning (2008), the fixed effects model has a 
statistically significant effect on the main two variables of the 
model: oil rents per capita and their interaction with total natural 
resources. The level of democracy is negatively associated with 
oil rents per capita and positively associated with the interaction 
term. These results account for only the Latin countries for a proper 
comparison to Dunning’s (2008) model. Our results indicated a 
negative association between oil rents per capita (see the second 
column of Table 2). However, Dunning’s study (2008) indicated 
oil rents per capita as positively associated with the level of 
democracy. One reason for this discrepancy may be that the results 
shown in Table 2 are based on panel-fixed effects regressions, in 
contrast with Dunning’s (2008) OLS regression.
Results similar to Dunning’s (2008) were expected; this study, in 
part, replicated his work. However, our study utilized what we 
believe to be a better estimation technique. Our results focus on 
fixed effects, though it is likely that polity correlates over time, thus 
the need for employing an Arellano-Bond estimation technique. In 
other words, the fixed-effects model overestimates the results, but 
the Arellano-Bond estimates more statistically significant results 
(see column 4, Table 2).
The Arellano-Bond estimates employ many lags of levels and 
differences as instrumental variables, and their exogeneity must be 
tested. The generalized methods of moments tests allowed us to run 
our exogeneity test. With one lag of polity (shocks to polity require 
2 years to sort through the system), the test rejects exogeneity (P 
< 1%) (results available upon request). As noted above, our study 
determined state ownership jointly with polity; that is, it was 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation
Min. Max
Polity 2.318 6.615 −9 10
Oil Rents per capita in 
$1,000,000 units 
0.025 0.044 0 0.3
Total natural resource over 
GDP
14.782 28.283 0 214.5
Oil rent per capita * Total 
natural resource over 
GDP (interaction terms) 
0.784 2.282 0 20.8
Log GDP 24.074 1.872 20.6 28.1
Square of Log GDP 583.042 90.604 423.3 791.8
Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 2001
0.288 0.216 0.0193 0.6621
Fragility 2010 7.144 4.418 0 14
Muslim percentage 2001 19.100 33.549 0 93.41
Catholic percentage 2001 38.228 40.790 0 92.72
Orthodox percentage 2001 12.652 22.126 0 89.04
State ownership of oil 1.633 1.520 0 4
State ownership is a scale 0-4 with a distribution
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endogenous with polity. It also employed two lags of polity, resulting 
in a marginal P-value of 5.5% in the second lag. In the interest of 
caution in modeling, we kept the second lag. Moreover, it forces 
acceptable lags of levels and changes in other variables further into 
the past. Thus, the exogeneity is no longer rejected (P = 19.5%). 
The Arellano-Bond model, with two lags and a robust standard 
error, shows that the estimated effect of one standard deviation 
change of oil rents per capita (0.032) on polity is about −20 times 
0.032, or −6.4 points. That is an entire standard deviation of polity 
and a substantial effect on a scale from −10 to +10. All estimations 
find that GDP has a non-linear effect on polity, reducing it to the 
level of log GDP, which is equal to the linear term divided by twice 
the negative of the quadratic term, 8.906/(0.394), or about 22.6. 
The range of log GDP is 20.57 to 28.37, and about one-fourth of 
the observations are below 22.6. Thus, the effect of GDP is only 
slightly negative for the poorest countries and positive for most 
countries. From 20.57 to 22.6, the effect is a drop of less than one 
point of polity, but the increase is over six points, approaching 
28.37 (The constant term corrects for the mean of log GDP). The 
estimates of the effect of GDP are greater with fixed effects only, 
but the lack of lagged polity effects overstates those estimates.
The fixed covariates, ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 2001, 
fragility in 2010, Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox percentage of 
the population in 2001 can be tested only in the random-effects 
model (the random effect model is available upon request). They 
are collinear and statistically significant as a group (P = 1%), which 
might result from the correlation with the fixed effects, which these 
variables appear to be part of. In any case, they are controlled for 
in the fixed effects and the Arellano-Bond estimation.
Our study found that having a higher GDP is good for a country. 
These findings agree with the majority of the literature: high oil 
profits tend to result in poor economic performance, unbalanced 
growth, weakly institutionalized states, and authoritarian regimes. 
More succinctly: oil is indeed a curse. Thus, we disagree with 
Dunning’s (2008) claim of an observed variation mediating the 
relationships between resource rents and political regime types. 
However, we do agree with Dunning’s (2008) second hypothesis 
that a high ratio of total natural resource rents to total GDP leads 
to dependence. We also agree with Dunning (2008) that the total 
amount of natural resource rents is a weaker factor than its ratio 
to total GDP. However, Dunning (2008) nor we directly support 
the hypothesis that there is a conditionally positive effect of 
natural resources on democracy when the degree of dependence is 
lower. Instead, we address the same primary question as Dunning 
regarding the relationship between the ratio of total natural 
resources rents and the total GDP, using a different econometric 
approach with countries across Latin America and Eurasia. 
5. DISCUSSION
Dunning’s (2008) work compliments the later critiques of the 
rentier state literature. He argued that there are conditional factors 
that determine the impact of natural resources on a state. First, there 
is a conditionally positive effect of natural resources on democracy 
when the degree of resource dependence is low. Authoritarianism 
is heightened, not necessarily by resource wealth (not all oil states 
are authoritarian) but by the extent of the dependence on these 
rents. When resources are the only economical source, conflict over 
the distribution of rents is more influential than the redistribution 
of non-resource wealth. 
Second, there is a conditionally positive effect of natural 
resources on democracy when the degree of inequality in non-
resource sectors of the economy is high. Rents can mitigate 
the redistributive tensions in a highly unequal society. It is the 
mitigation of inequality rather than the desire to control the 
distribution of resource rents that becomes the focus of the elite. 
This situation then lessens the elites’ incentives to take power 
by force. 
We disagree with Dunning (2008) that other variables mediate the 
relationship between resource rents and the political regime type; 
thus, we, consequently, explain variation in observed outcomes 
across resource-rich states. We agree with Treisman (2010) that, for 
countries like Russia with an established oil industry, significant 
increases in the scale of mineral incomes have only a minor effect 
on the political regime. We agree with Ross (2009) that there are 
degrees of being cursed and natural resources other than oil affect 
democracy to a lesser degree in comparison. 
Treisman concluded that “controlling for country characteristics, 
and looking at the full period, it is only among very poor countries 
that oil and gas income correlates over time with less democracy” 
(2010, p. 8-9). We agree; extremely poor countries demonstrate 
a greater variance and provide for more pronounced results than 
Table 2: The fixed‑effects model
Variable Fixed Effects model 
(Latin Countries Model)
Fixed Effects Model 
(Full Sample)
Arellano-Bond Model with 2 
Lags and Robust (Full Sample)
Polity lag 1 - - 0.7947351** (0.0468131)
Polity lag 2 - - −0.0859603 (0.04479)
Oil Rents per capita in $1,000,000 units −111.0392** (22.86739) −62.90901** (11.23303) −19.90192** (6.889187)
Total natural resource over GDP 0.0580197 (0.0664899) −0.0029702 (0.0154568) −0.0043624 (0.0091771)
Oil rent per capita * Total natural 
resource over GDP (interaction terms)
1.675617** (0.579682) 0.5076285* (0.201352) 0.224422* (0.1238923)
Log GDP −58.95418** (7.785759) −25.96136** (3.803872) −8.905981** (2.449826)
Square of Log GDP 1.240288** (0.1526189) 0.5909871** (0.0775912) 0.1965821** (0.0505975)
State ownership of oil −1.796906** (0.4677404) −0.7683562* (0.2990474) −0.195149 (0.1744664)
Constant term 706.3166** (99.38653) 284.9869** (46.58565) 101.2006** (29.69831)
*Means P<0.05, and **means P<0.01. The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors. The dependent variable is a polity score (democracy level)
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more affluent countries, which is why our model controls for total 
GDP. We also disagree with Loung and Weinthal (2010), who 
argue that state ownership (instead of natural resource wealth) is 
the main factor affecting democracy levels. Loung and Weinthal 
did not provide robust and empirical support for their argument, 
but we tested the validity of their argument and could not find 
support for it. The variable of state ownership is statistically 
significant in the fixed effects model, which deals with it as an 
exogenous variable. However, we did not find state ownership to 
be statistically significant using the Arellano-Bond model, where 
we dealt with it as an endogenous variable.
It is also important to indicate that our results contradict the 
findings of some studies in the natural resource curse literature 
that have used panel research designs. For instance, Lederman 
and Maloney (2008) argued that the negative effects of natural 
resources could disappear by including fixed effects. Torres et al. 
(2012) have also provided evidence that the negative effects could 
disappear in a panel design. However, using neither a fixed-effects 
model nor our Arellano-Bond model provided results that correlate 
with these arguments.
If one examines the intercountry variation, the strongest correlation 
is among countries at intermediate levels of development, with 
GDP per capita at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) between $5,000 
and $15,000. Ross (2009) noted that the association between higher 
resource wealth and less democracy does not appear in data from 
before the early 1980s. Until then, oil and gas did not appear to 
have any effect on democracy. It was in the “Third Wave” of 
democracy, which culminated in the East European transition 
from communism, that major oil producers started to stand out, 
democratizing less than their oil-poor neighbors. Fixed effects 
regressions show no effect of oil on democracy before 1985, and 
random effects models indicate that earlier periods demonstrated 
weaker effects, compared to more recent periods. Note that random 
effect models might be misperceived, as discussed above. Oil rent 
per capita consistently has negative effects, and the interaction 
term is also statistically significant.
6. CONCLUSION
There has been much debate in the natural resource curse literature 
on finding the answer to whether natural resources affect the 
level of democracy within a country. Starting with Ross (2001), 
numerous studies have suggested a negative correlation between 
natural resource dependence and the level of democracy. However, 
Haber and Menaldo (2011) published an influential study to rebut 
this trend. Haber and Menaldo (2011) claim that most studies 
finding a negative association suffer from serious econometric 
issues. Their findings strongly reject a resource curse, but the 
results still depend on specification. 
This study utilized both a fixed-effects model and a lagged Polity 
effects model for Latin American and Eurasian countries. It has, 
again, found support for the resource curse theory. Our study has 
accounted for the criticisms raised by Haber and Menaldo (2011) 
by using an Arellano-Bond model. We have also accounted for 
Loung and Weinthal’s (2010) criticisms by adding a variable to 
control for state ownership of the natural resources. Our results 
from both the standard, fixed-effect model, and the Arellano-
Bond model show that a) oil wealth negatively affects the level 
of democracy, and b) there is a negative correlation between oil 
rents per capita and Polity. 
This study supports the theory that the more oil revenues a state 
accrues, the less likely it is to experience a democratic system. 
The generalized method of moments estimation employs lags and 
levels as instrumental variables, allowing for both fixed-effects 
and lagged dependent variables. Thus, our findings allow us to 
state that natural resource dependence is really a curse.
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